People vs. Panis

People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Panis
GR No. L–58674–77, July 11, 1990
FACTS:

On January 9, 1981, four information were filed in the in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that herein private respondent Serapio Abug, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals. Abug filed a motion to quash contending that he cannot be charged for illegal recruitment because according to him, Article 13(b) of the Labor Code says there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee.”

Denied at first, the motion to quash was reconsidered and granted by the Trial Court in its Orders dated June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981. In the instant case, the view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two or more persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code provides for the innocence or guilt of the private respondent of the crime of illegal recruitment

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court reversed the CFI’s Orders and reinstated all four information filed against private respondent.

The Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was merely intended to create a presumption, and not to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto.

Where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create the said presumption.

Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. vs. NLRC, and Tuazon

Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and Tuazon
333 SCRA 236, GR No. 123619, June 8, 2000
FACTS:

On March 17, 1991, petitioner deployed respondent Benjamin T. Tuazon, (now deceased and represented by his daughter in the instant case) to work as radio officer on board its vessel, MV Pixy Maru for a period of 12 months. Prior to his deployment and as a condition to final hiring, Benjamin was required to submit to a medical examination with the petitioner's accredited clinic, the LDM Clinic and Laboratory. The medical examination consisted among others, of the standard X-ray exposure, and urine tests. In 1986, complainant underwent a heart surgery for an insertion of a pacemaker, so petitioner’s accredited clinic required Benjamin to secure from his cardiologist a certification to the effect that he could do normal physical activities. Consequently, he was declared fit to work. While on board the vessel, however, Benjamin suffered bouts of coughing and shortness of breathing. He was immediately sent and confined to a hospital in Japan from December 12 to 27, 1991. Due to the medical findings that an open heart surgery was needed, he was repatriated back in the Philippines on December 28, 1991. Upon arrival, Seagull referred him to its accredited physician and an open-heart surgery was performed, with Benjamin shouldering all the costs and expenses. He later filed a complaint asking for sickness and disability benefits with the POEA.

The POEA rendered a decision in favor of respondent Benjamin Tuazon and ordered herein petitioners to pay US$2,200 representing 120 days sickness benefits, and the amount of US$15,000.00 representing the permanent disability benefits provided for under Appendix "A" of the POEA Standard Contract. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the POEA’s judgment, finding that it was sufficiently established that herein petitioners’ physician already knew, as early as June 1989, of the existence of complainant's pacemaker, the main reason why they asked him to submit a medical certificate to the effect that he could do normal physical activities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is entitled to sickness benefits and permanent disability benefits

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground there is no merit in petitioners' suggestion that private respondent did not make a full disclosure of his medical history because the records reveal that private respondent was deployed by petitioners twice already, the first one being in 1989 and the second one being in 1991.

Under the employment contract, compensability of the illness or death of seamen need not depend on whether the illness was work connected or not. It is sufficient that the illness occurred during the term of the employment contract.

It is not necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the employees must have been in perfect health at the time he contracted the disease. If the disease is the proximate cause of the employee's death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant, and recovery may be had for said death, independently of any pre-existing disease.

Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, and Inductivo

Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and Inductivo
318 SCRA 623, GR No. 130772, November 19, 1999
FACTS:

Petitioner employed private respondent’s husband, Faustino Inductivo, as utilityman for MT Rowan, for a period of ten months. Faustino underwent pre-employment medical examination and his employer's doctors found him physically fit for work, so he boarded the vessel on May 13, 1993, Barely two months before the expiration of his employment contract, or on January 1994, he was discharged from the vessel, under a "mutual consent, on completion of 8 months and 5 days." On January 19, 1994, Faustino was hospitalized after complaining of occasional coughing and chest pains. After a series of transfers from one hospital to another, Faustino was brought to the Makati Medical Center where the doctor found that his disease was already in its advanced stage. Faustino succumbed to his illness on April 23, 1994 and the autopsy report showed as cause of death disseminated intravascular coagulations, septecalmia, pulmonary congestion and multiple intestinal obstruction secondary to multiple adhesions.

Before Faustino death, or sometime in February 1994, respondent Elizabeth Inductivo went to petitioners to claim the balance of her husband’s leave wages. Petitioners said, however, that her husband was not entitled to sickness benefits because he was not sick at the time he was "offsigned" from the vessel; he was "offsigned" from the vessel on "mutual consent" and not on medical grounds; and since he failed to advise or notify petitioners in writing within seventy-two hours of his alleged sickness, his right to claim sickness benefits was deemed forfeited. Respondent Elizabeth filed a compliant against petitioners for the payment of sickness and insurance benefits, which was amended to include death benefits after Faustino died. The Labor Arbiter ordered petitioners to pay the complainant, for herself and in her capacity as guardian of her two minor children. On appeal, the NLRC sustained the Labor Arbiter, and the motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is entitled to death benefits

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, giving credence to the finding of the NLRC that the illness was contracted during the Faustino's employment on board MT Rowan.

The POEA standard employment contract is designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its provisions must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in favor or for the benefit of the seamen and their dependents.

Medical opinions of an employer’s doctor which are palpably self-serving and biased in favor of the employer cannot prevail over the entries in the Death Certificate and Autopsy Report.

It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits provided therefore. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his death.

More Maritime Agencies, Inc. vs. NLRC, and Homicillada

More Maritime Agencies, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and Homicillada
307 SCRA 189, GR No. 124927, May 18, 1999
FACTS:

Petitioner hired private respondent Homicillada as an oiler on board the vessel MV Rhine and he boarded the vessel at Port Sete, France on February 5, 1994. When the vessel was anchored in Brazil, Homicillada was tasked to clean the main engine, and the first and second cylinders of the air trunk, which he did four consecutive days. As he went about his work, he experienced pain on his left leg which began to swell thereafter. The ship doctor said Homicillada should be allowed to rest for five days, but the Captain still required him to work. On April 27, 1994, he was repatriated to the Philippines and underwent a series of physical examinations. The ACT-scan image of Homicillada’s lower back revealed a “slipped-disc,” so the diagnostic center suggested laminectomy and dissection on his lower back to alleviate his pain. However, petitioner disregarded the recommendation and proposed instead a pelvic traction treatment, a less costly procedure, which did not improve Homicillada’s condition. Homicillada filed a compliant to the POEA for disability and medical benefits as well as for payment of his two months basic salary which petitioners had withheld.

The POEA sustained Homicillada and ordered petitioners jointly and severally to pay Homicillada US$1,642.30 or 14.93% of US$11,000.00. Appealing to the NLRC, Homicillada insisted that he was entitled to more than the amount decreed by the POEA, while petitioners asserted that his sickness was not work-connected and was in fact already in existence prior to his deployment abroad. The NLRC increased the disability award to US$7,465.00 based on POEA Memorandum Circular No.5, upgrading the basis for disability allowance to US$50,000.00. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition which states that the NLRC completely ignored a “Receipt and Release” purportedly signed by Homicillada receiving P15,750.00 from petitioners while the case was pending in POEA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is entitled to disability benefits

COURT RULING:

Being more inclined to believe the findings of the POEA, which are supported by substantial evidence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

The law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than what a worker is entitled to recover nor prevent him from demanding benefits to which he is entitled.

Requisites for a valid quitclaim: (a) There was no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties; (b) The consideration of the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and, (c) The contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

Compensability of an ailment does not depend on whether the injury or disease was pre-existing at the time of the employment but rather if the disease or injury is work-related or aggravated the worker’s condition.

Fleischer Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, Ruamar, et. al.

Fleischer Company, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Ruamar, et. al.
355 SCRA 105, GR No. 121608, March 26, 2001
FACTS:

Petitioner, an agricultural plantation, hired private respondents as security guards in 1989 due to their being members of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF). Respondent Ruamar, who was hired as a utility man, was terminated from service on February 23, 1990 while respondent security guards Dalit, Vivero and Dubal were all terminated on March 13, 1990. Respondents, then, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter Aponesto. They insisted that they were entitled to wage differentials on the ground that as security guards their wages should be based on the industrial rate and not on the agricultural rate. Petitioner rejected respondents’ money claims contending that they are agricultural workers and not underpaid, and that the company’s payroll showed that they were given their money claims.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondents were illegally dismissed from service and ordered petitioner to pay the respondents’ respective separation pay, all on the ground that petitioner failed to sufficiently establish the facts to warrant the dismissal of the respondents. He, however, declined to award respondents their backwages because petitioner was found to be in good faith when it offered to pay respondents their separation pay as indicated in their letters of dismissal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s finding of illegal dismissal on the ground that the case us analogous to or one involving redundancy since rh respondents’ services were no longet needed when the latter cased to be members of the CHDF abd when duly licensed security guards were already hired. The payment of separation pays was likewise ordered by the NLRC but later modified the decision by deleting the monetary award in favor of respondent Dalit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there existed an employer-employee relationship between the parties

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court accorded great weight and respect to the findings of the NLRC that there exists an employer-employee relationship between the parties, and, therefore, affirmed the NLRC’s first decision as modified by the resolution also made by NLRC.

It is well-settled that the existence of an employer-employee relationship is essentially a factual question and the NLRC’s findings thereon are accorded great weight and espect and even finality when the same are supported by substantial violence.

A review in the Supreme Court concerning factual findings in labor cases is confined to determining allegations of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

Lapid vs. NLRC, Phil Hanse Ship Agency, et. al.

Lapid vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Phil Hanse Ship Agency, et. al.,
306 SCRA 349, GR No. 117518, April 29, 1999
FACTS:

Respondent Phil Hans employed petitioner’s son, Ariel, to be a steward on board M/V Cast Muskox in Canada. Ariel left for the said country in September 1990 and was supposed to come home in August 1991 upon the termination of the 1-year period of employment contract. However, his lifeless body was found hanging by the neck from the ceiling of an abandoned warehouse in Quebec, Canada on August 13, 1991. After examining the corpse, the coroner reported that the causer of death was asphyxiation by hanging and, therefore, the circumstances of death was following self-destruction. Based on the said report, Phil Hanse informed petitioner that Ariel committed suicide.

When the remains arrived in Manila on August 29, 1991, petitioner noticed immediately that it bore several bruises so petitioner sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and submitted the cadaver for post mortem examination. The NBI reported that the body vore abrasions on the elbow, contusions on the forehead, hematoma and ligature marks on the neck, all of which are inconsistent with the suicide earlier reported. Petitioner then filed a claim with the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) asserting that Ariel was a victim of foul play abroad in the course of his overseas employment. However, the POEA Administrator ruled that the pieces of evidence adduced substantially proved that suicide was committed just as what the coroner reported. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the assailed decision based on a conclusion that since Ariel’s $2,000.00 remained in tact in his wallet when his body was found and that based on the coroner’s report, Ariel committed suicide and there was no foul play at all.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to death benefits under Sec. 6(6), Part II of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seamen

COURT RULING:

Finding that the coroner’s report to be incomplete, the Phil Hanse’s evidence to be lean, frail and far from convincing, and that Phil Hanse failed to ascertain the circumstances of Ariel’s death, the Supreme Court reversed the NLRC’s decision and ordered the remand of the case to the POEA for computation of death benefits.

It is the employer’s duty to ascertain the circumstances surrounding its employee’s death while the employee was on the course of his work.

Under Section 6 (6), Part II of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seamen, if the injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seaman was because of his own doing, no compensation shall be payable.

The employer must prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is attributable to the seaman, in order for the employer to evade any liability for death benefits.